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THE COIMON LAW SPECIFIC LIEN.
The specific or particular common law lien, as it is some-
times called, may be defined as the right to retain the property
of another for some particular claim or charge upon the inci-
dental property detained.'
The specific lien was derived from the civil law and is
founded on justice and equity; it has always been favored by
the courts. Best, J., in Jacobs v. Latour, says, "The doctrine
of the lien is so just as between debtor and creditor that it can-
not be too much favored," 2 and Lord Kenyon in Kirkham v.
Shawoross, says, "It has been the wish of the courts in all
cases and at all times to carry the lien of the common law as
far as possible." 3
It was first given to that class of persons who by the nature
of their business were compelled by law to receive the goods
without freedom to discriminate. The next step forward was
where the courts gave to the bailee a lien who by skill and labor
improved the intrinsic value of the article bailed to him. Before
Chase v. Westmore, " no lien was given for work done pnder a
special agreement, but now it is immaterial whether the price
is fixed or not.5 In Jackson v. Cummings,6 the idea that there
had to be intrinsic improvement in order to create a lien finally
exploded.
The specific common law lien may arise in one of the fol-
lowing ways: implications of law, usage or custom, and by
contract. The following classes, with a certain limitation, have
been given the specific common-law lien: common carriers, inn-
keepers, sellers, finders for reward, landlord under the pro-
cess of distraint, and every bailee for hire who by his skill and
labor has imparted an additional value to the article bailed to
him.
The common carrier is perhaps the first great class of per-
sons to be given a specific common law lien. In 1702 Holt, C. J.,
"Houghton v. Matthews, 3 B. & P. 485, 127 English Reprint 263
(1870).
25 Bingh. 132, 130 English Reprint 1010 (1828).
3 6 Term Reports 17, 101 English Reprint 410 (1794).
4.5 Maule & Selu. 180, 105 English Reprint 1016 (1816).
5 Kent Com. 635, Blake v. Nicholson, 3 Maule & Selu., 168, 105 Eng-
lish Reprint 573 (1814).
85 M. & W. 342, 151 English Reprint 145 (1839).
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laid down the rule that the common carrier could retain the
goods until he was paid for the charges of carriage.7  The
principal reason for giving the common carrier a lien is be-
cause of the liability imposed upon him by law to carry safely.
The courts of both England and America have consistently fol-
lowed the rule laid down in Skinner v. Upshaw.8
The special lien of the carrier covers all the goods he car-
ries under any one consignment,9 and in the absence of a special
agreement he is not bound to deliver the goods until the charges
have been paid. It attaches to each and every part of the goods
carried and a delivery of part does not defeat the lien on the
other for the whole amount. 10 The lien extends to freight ad-
vanced to other carriers if the goods have passed over more than
one route, but it does not extend to former freight unpaid, nor
to overcharges, nor to acts performed entirely outside the car-
riage contract."i The lien also extends to the baggage of the
passenger for the amount of his fare.12
T  Sinner v. Upshaw, 2 Lord Rym 752, 92 English Reprint 3 (1702).
' Skinner v. lUpshaw, supra.
'Hate v. Barett, 26 Illinois, 195. (1861).
1052 Kentucky 191.
New Haven & N orthampton Company v. CampbeN, 128 Mass. 104
(1880). The delivery, by a common carrier to a consignee, of a part of
goods transported by the former, without payment of freight and ad-
vances does not discharge the lien of the carrier upon the remainder
for the whole amount of charges, unless it was the intention of the
parties to do so; and this is a question of fact for the jury.
1Bissel v. Price, 16 Illinois 408 (1885). In holding that the carrier
would recover for freight advanced, says he must see that the previous
charges are reasonable before he is authorized to pay them; for it is
not every charge, which every extortioner, through whose hands goods
in transit may see fit to impose upon, that he is authorized to pay, and
thus fix upon the owner a certain liability to that extent.
Briggs v. Boston & Towe71 R. Co., 6 Allen (Mass.) 246 (1863). The
carrier acts as the forwarding agent of the owner (in the absence of
special instructions) of the goods in giving directions for their carriage
over succeeding lines and the succeeding carrier has a lien even in case
of mistake in direction for freight earned by him and for charges
advanced to others. Steamboat Virginia v. Kraft, 25 Mo. 75 (1857).
Where the carrier pays to the shipper charges, which the consignee
owes to the shipper, but not in connection with the goods, the carrier
can not recover charges of the consignee. Hingston v. Wendt, 1 Q. B.
D. 367 (1876). A ship having gone ashore the captain put H in posses-
sion authorizing him as his agent to do what was for benefit of all con-
cerned. Saved the cargo. Held he had a lien as agent's owner, general
average, one to whom bills of lading are handed has a right to bind
owner.
"Wolf v. Summers, 2 Comp. 631, 170 English Reprint 1275 (1811).,
Master of a ship held to have a lien on a truck filled with wearing ap-
parel and a writing desk for the passage money of the passenger. But
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As to whether the carrier has a lien for demurrage is
a question not fully settled. Text writers state 13 and English
courts hold that 14 the carrier does not have a lien for demur-
rage. Some of the American courts have followed the English
rule,15 but the weight of authority is otherwise and the general
rule seems to be that independently of contract the carrier has
a lien for demurrage. 16
The innkeeper was given a specific common law lien be-
cause he was compelled by law to receive all comers and be re-
sponsible for their safety and baggage. 17  The courts in early
decisions maintained the idea that the innkeeper would have a
lien on the person of his guest and could detain him and strip
him of his clothes, but this idea has been totally discarded and
they now hold that the lien does not extend to the person or
clothes of the guest for that would amount virtually to im-
prisonment.' s The lien of the innkeeper extends only to the
goods and property of his guest which are received on the faith
of the innkeeping relation:' 9
There seems to be no reason, aside from public policy, which
can be advanced as to why the warehouseman was given a spe-
cific common law lien. In Stenman v. Wilkins,20 the court ad-
vances as a reason for giving the lien the theory that he adds
additional value in practically the same way as the carrier. One
the carrier or agents are not justified in forcefully taking the baggage
or parcel from the passenger and if they use such means they will be
guilty of assault and battery. Bransden v. Boston & Albany R. Oro., 104
Mass. 117 (1870).
Hale on Ballments, pp. 346-347.
34Birley v. Gladstone, 3 Maule & S. 205, 105 English Reprint 587(1814).
'NicolZette Lumber Co. v. Peoples Coal Co., 213 Pa. 379, 62 AtL
1060 (1906).
Ml l~er v. Ga. R. R. & Banking Co., 88 Ga. 563, 155 S. E. 316 (1891);
Ky. Wagon Mfg. Co. v. Ohio & Miss. By. Go., 98 Ky. 151 (1895); Norfolk
& W. B. Co. v. Adams, Va. 18 S, E. 673 (1884) Code; Darlington v. Mo.
Pac. By. Co., 99 Mo. App. 1, 72 S. W. 122 (1902); New Orleans & N. E.
R. Co. v. George - Co., 82 Miss. 710, 35 Sou. 193 (1903). Where demur-
rage is due on several cars it need not be enforced against each separ-
ately, but only enough be detained to satisfy the charge on all.
17 Thompson v. Lacey, 3 B. & Ald. 283, 106 English Reprint 667(1820).
Is Sunbolf v. Alford, 3 M. & W. 248, 150 English Reprint 1153 (1838).
Can not forcefully take off the clothes of the guest and detain him.
Swan v. Bournes, 47 Iowa 501. Innkeeper given a lien on coat of guest
which was part of his ordinary wearing apparel
" Schouler on Bailments, Sees. 326-328.
'07 W. & S. (Pa.) 466 (1844).
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adds value by delivering at a different place and the other at
a different time. On the same principle that the carrier is
given a lien the warehouseman should also have one, but this is
fallacious reasoning for the carrier is not given a lien because
-of added value but because of his liability. The warehouseman
is under no special liability, and he does not add specific value,
but whether there is a sufficient reason or not to give him the
lien, by the great weight of authority he is given one.21
If the goods are received under one contract and part are
delivered without payment of charges, the warehouseman may
hold the balance for charges upon all the goods. 22 In Devereaux
v. Fleming 23 the question arose as to whether the warehouse-
man would have a claim for charges while he was enforcing his
lien. The court said, "In a case like the present when the con-
tract is for storage and for delivery on payment of charges,
the right to hold the goods under the original contract doe. not
cease until those charges are paid, released or tendered. This
seems to be the law in this case. As no tender or offer to pay
has been made the warehouse charges still go on."
The seller has a lien for purchase money and altho reten-
tion of possession of the property until payment is essential to
the existence of the lien, Yet the court in Buskirk Bros. v. Peck 24
held, that possession may be either constructive or actual, and
where goods are counted out and set apart for the purchaser,
but not actually delivered into his possession, the title passes
and there is sufficient delivery to execute the contract, yet the
seller has a lien for the purchase money. The doctrine was re-
ferred to and approved in Wiggain v. Mankin.25
21 Scott v. Jester, 3 Ark. 437; Low v. Martin, 18 Ill. 286; Stoddard
v. Crocker, 100 Me. 450, 62 Atl. 241 (1905); Low v. Martin, 18 Inl. 286
(1857). Does not know anything about the owner and holds himself
out as a publican so to speak, ready to accomodate all to extent of his
liability.
22Baker v. Brown, 138 Mass. 340 (1885); Devereauxr v. Fleming, 53
Fed. 401 (1892). 1. (b) Lien attached to any part of the goods for
the general balance due under any one contract. The phrase "under
one transaction" as used in reference to the specific common law lien
does not mean at the same time but pursuant to one contract. Case
distinguished from Homes v. Shipping Co., 8 H. L. Cas. 338. Test was
if all under one contract.
U Devereaux v. Fleming, supra.
2457 W. Va. 306, 50 S. E. 432 (1905).
2 65 W. Va. 219, 63 S. E. 1091 (1909).
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The landlord has a specific common law lien under the
process of distress, and while there are very few adjudged cases
on this particular phase of the lien, yet it seems that when the
point has arisen the courts have uniformly allowed the land-
lord a lien on the chattels of the tenant under this process. The
lien does not arise or exist until the goods of the tenant are
seized and levied upon.2 6  No lien existed before the statute of
8 Anne 0. 14. Before that time the landlord had only the right
to distrain. Lord Mansfield, speaking of this particular type
of lien in Williams v. Leper,27 says that goods remaining on the
premises to which the landlord has the right of entry is equiva-
lent to a pledge in his possession.
A finder of- a chattel for which a definite reward is offered
has a lien thereon for the reward.28 This lien arises, not from the
contract which only gives one the right to the reward, but arises
by the implication of law working through the contract relation
and gives the finder the right to retain the chattel until the re-
ward offered is paid. Unless there is a definite reward offered,
the finder is given no lien.2 9  Th6 finder of property on land is
a bailee thereof without reward.30 The owner, however, is liable
for necessary expenses of preservation.3 1 In such cases, while
no lien is given, the courts have held that property which has
been lost or stolen, when found, raises an implied promise on
the part of the owner to pay for its finding and preservation.
32
The greatest extension of the specific common law lien has
been in the field of bailees for hire who by their labor and skill
'a61 Ill. A. 552. (2) Taylor's, Landlord and Tenant, See. 575.
Rent is a lien upon the tenant's goods so long as they remain upon the
demised premises, and, at common law the right was gone the moment
they were removed from the premises, for the landlord had parted with
his lien, possession . . . necessary to existence of lien. Powe.l v.
DaiRy, 61 Ill. App. 552 (1895). Held that the common law doctrine of
landlords' lien did not apply in state.
3 Burr. (1886) 97 English Reprint 1152 (1766).
23Wentworth v. Day, 3 Met. (Mass.) 352 (1841).
"Wilson v. Guyton, 8 Gill, (Md.) 213 (1849).
1* 6 N. H. 213, 3 Iowa 88. Cory v. itfle, 6 N. H. 213 (1833). One
who finds the horse of another in his field has a right to turn the beast
into the highway and although she stray away he is not responsible.
Dougherty v. Posegate, 3 Iowa 88 (1856). Finder of money is required
to use only slight care and is liable for gross negligence only. If A
finds B's money and knows it is B's he is bound to make restitution of
the same without compensation.
Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286 (1871).
'24 Dana (Ky.) 193 (1836).
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have added value to the chattel bailed t6 them. The general
rule, which is laid down to cover such cases, is that every bailee
for hire who by his labor and skill has imparted an additional
value to the article bailed to him has a lien for his reasonable
charges. While this rule is not infallible it may be accepted as
fairly accurate. It has been suggested that there are two excep-
tions to this rule, namely, livery stable keepers and agisters.
By the great weight of authority neither of them was given a
common law lien. However, this rule has been questioned 3 3
and in one state the agister is given a common law lien.34
While there seems to have been no satisfactory reason ad-
vanced as to why they are not given a lien, the explanations ad-
vanced are, that no additional value is added, and uninterrupted
possession is not possible. Clearly, there are cases where pos-
session might be continuous and uninterrupted, and it seems
reasonable that a fat ox is worth more than a thin one, yet if
we apply the test of skill we may find that the bailee is lacking in
that one particular essential.
In Bevan v. Waters, 35 it was held that the trainer of a race
horse had a lien for his training service. The reason given is
that the bailee by his labor and skill has added additional value
to the horse by bringing it into condition to run in the races.
In Scarf v. Morgan 38 the owner of a stallion was allowed a lien
on the mare for the price of the leap. The reason given that the
mare being in foal would increase her value. In Nevan v.
Roupe 37 it was held that Roupe had a lien on the oats he had
threshed for the price of the threshing. In McMeekin v. Wor-
chester 38 it was held that one who took window sash to get glass
put in and glazed had a lien for the price of glazing and fitting
the glass.
B3Kelsey v. Layme, 28 Kan. 157 (1882). See also Lord v. Jones, 24
Me. 439; Harris v. Wooaruff, 124 Mass. 205.
"H oover v. E ler, 52 Pa. St. 522 (1866).
"Moo. & Mal. 235.
" 4 Mees. & Welsb. 270, 150 English Reprint 1430 (1828). (2) Lien
exists when there is an Increased value added provided there is nothing
in the contract inconsistent with its (liens) existence, such lien exists
equally whether there is an agreement to pay a stipulated price for the
labor and skill or an implied contract to pay a reasonable price. (4)
Mathias v. Sellers, 86 Pa. 486 (1878). The lien is not waived by a
special agreement merely for a payment of a fixed sum for the labor.
378 Iowa 207 (1859).
u99 Iowa 243, 68 N. W. 680 (1896).
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In the case of Judso* v. Etheridge,39 Bolland, B., speaking
of the specific common law lien, said, "The doctrin6 might be ex-
tended to a breaker who takes a young horse to be broken, on
the ground that it makes a different animal of it and improves
it by the application of labor and skill."
In Hanna v. Phelps,40 where 2,100 hogsheads were de-
livered to a lard renderer, it was held that the lard renderer had
a lien on the lard for the price of his services. A harness maker
who took harness to clean and oil has a lien for the price of his
services.41  One who takes tobacco of another to manufactur6
into cigars has a lien on the cigars for the price of the manufac-
turing.42 In the same way a cobbler for repairing a shoe, a
jeweler for setting a ring, a clock-maker for fixing a watch has
a lien on the repaired article for, the price of the repairs.
Only a few of the many cases where a bailee for hire
acquires a lien can be enumerated in the scope of this paper,
but we may attempt to lay down some rules to determine when
the lien will be given. In the first place a common law lien at-
taches exclusively to personal property.4 3 It extends only to
the debt created about a specific chattel. And it must be a bail-
ment in which it is generally understood that the bailee has a
right to compensation for his services.
The right to demand compensation is, as a rule, understood
to carry with it the right to compel compensation by a specific
lien.4 4 The lien does not extend to the servant of the bailee, for
the possession of the servant is the possession of the master,45
nor does it extend to a sub-contractor, 46 because there is no
privity of relationship between the owner and the sub-contrac-
tor. The general rule is that the article must be enhanced in
value.47
See Jackson v. Cummins, supra.
40 63 Am. Dec. 410 (1855).
4Wilson v. Martin, 40 N. H. 88, (1860).
42 (4) Mathews v. Sellers, 86 Pa. St. 486 (1878). The lien is not
waived by a special agreement merely for a payment of a fixed sum for
the labor.
Openham v. Esdaile, 2 Y. and J. 493, 148 English Reprint 1013
(1828).
Schouler on Bailments, 2nd ed., See. 122.
0Whzite v. Smith, 23 Fla. 160, 15 V. Room 105 (1882), 43 Am. Rep.
347.
4 Meyers v. Bratespiece, 174 Pa. 118, 34 Atl. 551 (1896).4
, Hanna v. Phelps, supra.
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Possession is an essential element to the existence of the
specific common law lien and the general rule is that the loss of
possession is the loss of the lien. The possession must be right-
fully obtained -with the knowledge and consent of the owner
either express or implied.48 While there are few adjudged cases
on this particular point yet the rule seems to be well settled and
sound that improvement of personal property by the bailee with
the knowledge of the bailer's ownership and either with or
without the latter's consent or knowledge, or with mere knowl-
edge under the circumstances so that no consent or liability can
be implied creates no liability on the part of the owner to pay
for the services. 4 9
As to just what possession is necessary for the retention of
the lien is a question that is in controversy. Some courts hold
that constructive possession alone is all that is necessary. 5° In
the case of Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Close,51 where a manufacturer
of lumber delivered the lumber to the servant of the owner to
be put on stick in the mill yard, it was held that such delivery
was not sufficient to divest the company of their lien on the
lumber for the price of sawing. The court in deciding this case
said, "We cannot bring ourselves to believe that the company
intended that the lumber should go out of their possession or
waive or relinquish their lien. We cannot bring ourselves to
the conclusion that such was the contract or its legal, effect."
This case again brought up the question as to whether a bailee
when he performs the services on the land of the owner has suf-
ficient possession to maintain his lien. In Bank of Montreal v.
J. E. Potts Salt and Lumber 0.52 one who manufactured salt
at the owner's salt lot under an agreement that he was to furnish
barrels, nails, etc., to pay for all needed repairs and deliver the
salt to the dock and be responsible for the same was held to
have a lien on the salt on the dock. In Roberts v. Bank of
Ontario rs one who was employed to manufacture brick by the
owner of the brickyard, possession. of the lot in the lien-claimant
for the purpose of the contract, was held to have a lien on the
"Baughman Auto Co. v. Emmanue, 187 Ga. 354, 73 S. E. 511 (1912).
4 69 Me. 425; 174 Pa. 119; 19 Pick. 228; Baughman Auto Co., supra.
- 81W . Va. 205, 94 S. E. 132, 3 A.L. IL.. 857 (1917).
- 81 W. Va. 205, 94 S. E. 132, 3 A. L. R. 857 (1917).
91 Mich. 342, 51 N. W. 890 (1892).
" 21 Ontario App. Reps. 629.
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brick which he had manufactured. It seems to be assumed in
Oaces v. Moore 54 that one who cuts timber on the land of an-
other has a lien on-the timber for his services, but if he de-
livers the timber to be sawed his right of lien is relinquished.
*While the authorities are not in accord, yet the weight of
authority and the better rule seems to be that if the bailee has
a right to be on the premises of the owner for the purpose of im-
provement of the article of bailment he has sufficient ownership
to maintain the lien.
KING FUM.
424 Me. 214 (1844).
